‘Turkey without Terror’ Process Should Not Be Held Hostage to Syria
We are addressing this process as it completes its first year. I want to evaluate what has been achieved in this one-year period, what point has been reached, what risks lie ahead, and the process’s regional reflections, especially those centered on Syria.
When Devlet Bahçeli brought this issue up last October, we were all surprised, as there was no such expectation on the agenda of either politicians or the public. Bahçeli based this move on geopolitical developments. The fundamental dynamic he referred to was the change triggered by Israel in the region post-October 7, which completely altered the existing status quo. Bahçeli argued that this 50-year-old problem needed to be resolved for Turkey to gain a sort of immunity against the threats posed by this new status quo. Therefore, in his argument, the process was an initiative aimed at protecting Turkey from potential threats and troubles.
However, it took three to four months for this initiative to gain concrete traction. Although Mr. Bahçeli brought it up, the President did not respond immediately. While offering rhetorical support, he did not rush to activate state institutions and mechanisms. The main development that transformed this initiative from a ‘Bahçeli initiative’ into a government and state project was the revolution in Syria in December. In my opinion, if this revolution in Syria had not occurred, the issue could have remained an abstract matter for a long time.
The revolution in Syria transformed the process from a perception of ‘threat’ to one of ‘opportunity’ for Turkey. Turkey had not considered the threat from regional developments alone as a sufficient reason to start a process. However, the new situation that emerged in Syria made it meaningful to make a start. When the perceptions of threat and opportunity merged, it signaled to all actors that the process needed to be accelerated. This demonstrates how central foreign policy elements and regional change are to the rationale of the process.
In fact, Syria has always played a decisive role not only in how Turkey approaches the issue but also in the PKK’s continuation of its armed presence. Although the PKK and actors around it have been saying for years that armed struggle does not serve its objectives and has reached the end of its useful life, the organization postponed disarmament due to the fear of losing the gains it achieved in unstable regions like Syria. It will be recalled that Syria was also one of the core dynamics behind the collapse of the 2013-2015 resolution process. At that time, the PKK was unwilling to disarm in Turkey because of the potential gains in Syria. Therefore, Syria has served as a key function for both the state and the organization, in both the making and unmaking of the process.
In the past year, however, we have faced an interesting situation. Although both sides have kept Syria at the forefront of their political rhetoric and diplomatic initiatives, they have been careful to leave Syria out of the equation to prevent it from obstructing the process’s progress. While the PKK emphasized that its decision to disarm does not concern Syria, Turkey stated that the issue must include the goal of a ‘region without terror,’ or it would remain incomplete. Despite these contradictions, the process has not been derailed so far. Öcalan made his call, the PKK announced its decision, and the first symbolic steps were taken.
In the current negotiation process, some ‘gray areas’ are being left in an effort to align the Turkish and Syrian timetables. Such ambiguities can sometimes motivate the parties and advance the process, but at other times, they can play an obstructive role due to uncertainty.
In Turkey’s framework, achieving a gain in Syria would make it possible to derive maximum benefit from the process. However, even if significant progress is not made in Syria, the mere disarmament of the PKK in Turkey is, in itself, a sufficiently strong gain. We will see in the coming days whether the state will treat this as a precondition. At times, there are strong suggestions in the rhetoric that a legal regulation in parliament will require a parallel development in Syria.
The fundamental problem in Syria can be summarized under two headings: First is the question of whether an armed structure like the SDG will continue to exist without being integrated into the Syrian army. Second is whether there will be an autonomous administrative structure that undermines the country’s unitary structure. Resolving both of these issues will take time. Although all actors want to speed up the timeline, the process has its own natural rhythm. However, the ‘spirit of the times’ and the general trend in the region indicate that the SDG will have to back down on both of these demands. The instability following the Arab Spring and subsequent events has created a demand among the region’s countries and peoples for strong central governments. The era when non-state armed actors were popular is over. Therefore, the solution in Syria will not be found in the maximalist demands of either Turkey or the SDG, but somewhere in the middle, shaped by the region’s own dynamics.
In conclusion, while I accept how intertwined this issue is with regional dynamics, I do not believe it is politically correct to focus the entire public debate on Syria. It is impossible to isolate the process from the region, but it is wrong to index the entire matter to Syria and to send a message that a failure there would render the process in Turkey meaningless. Regardless of what happens in Syria, the disarmament of a 50-year-old terrorist organization—and the beginning of our political, social, and foreign policy imagination to think and act in a non-violent universe—is in itself an immense gain. Therefore, while keeping the importance of Syria in mind, I do not think it is right to mortgage the process in Turkey to Syria.
